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Heroin in the hospice: opioids and end-of-life discussions in the 1980s 
 
In 1979, a Toronto-based celebrity doctor and syndicated columnist, Kenneth Walker, who 
wrote under the pseudonym W. Gifford-Jones, launched a campaign to legalize heroin 
(diamorphine). In his view, it was one answer to the problem of treating end-of-life pain in 
Canadian society. His column, called “The Doctor Game,” printed in approximately ninety 
newspapers across the country, was his main platform. He also established the W. Gifford-
Jones Foundation to solicit donations to “continue the fight.” Much end-of-life suffering, he 
felt, was a by-product of inadequate administration of existing analgesics as well as unfair 
restrictions on heroin.
 
Canadians, unable to use heroin for medical purposes after the 
government took the WHO’s advice and banned it in 1955, were being denied heroin 
because of “political, not medical, decisions.” Little did Walker realize that he would open 
“Pandora’s box.”
 1
 
 
His story embodies how the politics of pain, opioid addiction, and proper end-of-life 
therapies present enduring challenges in a modern democratic society. Medico-political 
calculations blend consumer protection, patient safety, crime prevention, and medical 
innovation. Heroin started out as a wonder drug. Then, after it moved out of the doctor’s 
black bag and into the black market, heroin’s return in the early 1980s created a dichotomy. 
One group focused on the viability of the drugs used for pain relief, whereas another group 
took a broader approach to palliative care. While support for heroin was predicated on its 
efficacy and use in other jurisdictions, resistance to heroin was based on a philosophy of 
pain management in palliative care that was about more than just drugs. 
 
Walker built his argument for heroin on evidence of the drug’s effectiveness and its ongoing 
use in the U.K., where the drug was considered “an excellent sedative which is of estimable 
value in so many conditions”
2
. Because it was more soluble, heroin was a faster acting 
analgesic compared to morphine. This was important in treating emaciated patients with 
little muscle in which to inject a drug, making a large shot of morphine extremely painful. 
                                                            
1
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Walker also argued that heroin was beneficial for those patients troubled by the side effects 
of morphine, including nightmares, nausea, constipation, and hallucinations. 
 
By 1982, Walker had collected 30,000 signatures on a petition calling for heroin’s 
legalization and an additional 20,000 letters supporting his efforts. He had also investigated 
the use of heroin in the U.K. During a fact-finding mission in London, he met with pain 
specialists, nurses, nursing sisters, and patients throughout London’s hospitals. He visited 
Scotland Yard, where officials remarked that they had much larger crime concerns than 
therapeutic heroin. The trip further convinced Walker that heroin was a useful tool for 
physicians and the rules need to change in Canada.
3
 
 
That same year he presented his petition and letters requesting the legalization of heroin to 
the Federal Health and Welfare Minister Monique Bégin in Ottawa. This forced the 
government into action. She announced the formation of the Medical Advisory Committee 
on the Management of Severe Pain, populated by physicians and academics from Canada’s 
major research institutions. Edward Sellers, Professor of Pharmacology and Medicine, 
University of Toronto was Chairman, while Balfour Mount, Professor of Surgery and Director 
of Palliative Care, McGill University, served as Vice-Chair.
4
  
 
Walker argued that the committee members, including Mount, were opposed to heroin and 
felt it unlikely that the government would “admit it had been wrong for twenty-nine years.”
5
 
Concerned that the expert committee would stall legalization momentum, he formed the 
W. Gifford-Jones Foundation in early 1983 to galvanize public sentiment. In May 1983, 
Minister Bégin declared that the government would initiate extended clinical trials to 
evaluate the efficacy of heroin relative to morphine and Dilaudid, the other commonly used 
cancer analgesics. She stated: “Considering the enormous controversy about heroin, I 
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thought such research was essential.”
6
 
 
Walker, infuriated by what he perceived as delaying tactics, believed the medical evidence 
available already was more than any “other Minister could read in a lifetime.”
7
 Throughout 
1983-1984, he heightened the rhetoric in his national column, ran full-page advertisements 
in major newspapers, and leant on his friends in government. He published letters from 
Canadians whose loved ones had died in excruciating pain. And he ran a full-page ad in The 
Globe and Mail criticizing the Canadian Cancer Society’s opposition. In November 1984, he 
ran another ad, which stated boldly, “This Christmas will the real hypocrites please stand 
up.”
8
 
 
Powerful allies in the press, medical establishment, and government had emerged by this 
time. In November 1983, an editorial in The Toronto Star announced: “Heroin represents 
the most effective way some cancer patients can manage the terrible pain that can come 
with the disease. If these people need it, it should…be available to them.” The Globe and 
Mail also supported legalization. In June 1984, an editorial attacked the government for “30 
years of delay during which cancer patients have faced the ultimate pain without heroin, 
which is widely used in Britain where there are no political arguments against its medicinal 
use.”
9
  
 
Besides just editorial boards of Canada’s major newspapers, the Canadian Medical 
Association (CMA) supported Walker’s efforts. Dr. William Ghent proved especially 
influential. Leading the CMA’s Council on Healthcare, he exposed how deception 
characterized the original decision to ban heroin. Canada  succumbed to American pressures 
and government ministers, including Paul Martin, who had misled colleagues by suggesting 
that the CMA supported prohibition. In August 1984, the CMA’s general council 
recommended that physicians be authorized to prescribe heroin, the time being right for 
Canada to join the thirty-six other countries using medical heroin. “Heroin was banned,” 
Ghent argued, “on the naïve assumption by government and its police forces that if all 
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heroin was illegal, prosecution would be easier and thus illicit use of the drug would be 
eradicated.” He added: “We followed the U.S. like sheep and now, like sheep, we’ve got 
their manure to deal with.”
10
  
 
Jake Epp, the new Minister of Health following the Conservative victory in 1984, was stuck 
between the CMA’s recommendation and the expert advisory committee, which had 
rejected the use of heroin in medical settings. “It is not a technical question which we are 
addressing,” he stated, “but rather the meaning of life and how death with dignity can be 
enhanced.” On December 20, he announced that the government would legalize the use of 
heroin in cases of severe chronic pain or terminal illness. Epp declared legal heroin did not 
pose a threat to the safety of Canadians or that substance abuse would increase. One pro-
heroin supporter in the Ontario government criticized the Liberal government’s expert 
advisory committee, led by Sellers and Mount, as “biased” and “stacked with known 
opponents of heroin.” “It was like Chrysler or Ford looking into Japanese cars.”
11
 
 
Heroin, however, was more complicated than automobiles. Committee members viewed 
pain treatment as an interaction of physical, psychological, social, and spiritual elements. A 
single drug, whether heroin or morphine, was not sufficient to address this complicated 
experience. Mount believed that heroin distracted from crucial issues. The crisis over the 
drug’s legitimacy meant that less attention was given to anticipating pain and tackling end-
of-life care in a holistic manner. Walker viewed access to medical heroin as a way of dealing 
with cancer in an appropriate and respectful manner. He insisted that patient’s choices 
increase, while challenging myths and prejudices about heroin. He asked valuable questions 
about the use of powerful painkillers that are with us today. But not just anyone, Walker 
believed, could answer them. The medical community needed to lead: “clinical physicians, 
not politicians, should make the decision about heroin.”
12
 It was politics, in the first 
instance, that created the heroin controversy when what was needed was scientific, yet 
compassionate, and patient-centered analysis. 
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